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A Report from the Economic Research Service
Abstract
Marketing quota and price support programs for peanuts and tobacco were a long-
standing feature of U.S. farm policy, from the 1930s until the Government enacted quota 
buyouts, in 2002 for peanuts and 2004 for tobacco. Quota owners were compensated 
with temporary payments, but elimination of the quota programs exposed producers more 
to market risks and brought about structural changes at farm, regional, and marketwide 
levels.  Since the buyouts, many peanut and tobacco farms have exited production. The 
farms that remain are mostly larger and have adopted new risk management strategies, 
such as contracting.  Freed of the planting restrictions in the quota programs, production 
of peanuts, and to a lesser extent of tobacco, has been relocated to regions better suited 
to their growth. While total acreage and prices for peanuts and tobacco have remained 
below pre-buyout levels, the lower prices—along with increased production efficiency—
have supported renewed growth in demand, particularly in export markets.
Keywords: policy reform, farm policy, buyouts, marketing quotas, peanuts, tobacco, 
adjustment, structural change
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Summary
When longstanding marketing quota systems were eliminated (“bought out”) 
in 2002 for peanuts and 2004 for tobacco, producers lost quota-related price 
supports and other quota system protections and were exposed more directly 
to a market-oriented system. Their response to new economic challenges has 
markedly altered industry characteristics, including farm size, crop regions, 
and use of risk-management tools. The study identifies the market forces that 
have affected the post-buyout peanut and tobacco industries and adjustments 
that have ensued at the farm, regional, and domestic and foreign market levels.
What Is the Issue?
Until the buyouts, peanuts and tobacco had been among a small group of 
U.S. commodities regulated through quotas that limited supply and provided 
price supports. These programs fostered price stability, but caused market 
inflexibilities that undermined the long-term viability of the quota system. 
The peanut and tobacco quota programs also stood in contrast to evolving 
U.S. farm policy, which had moved toward planting flexibility and reduced 
most Government support tied to production of individual commodities. A 
central issue was how peanut and tobacco producers would adapt following 
the elimination of the quotas. In particular, how would the number of farms 
and farm scale, location, and risk-management strategies be affected by 
lower prices and greater exposure to market risk?
What Did the Study Find? 
After the buyouts, tobacco producers no longer received financial support 
from Federal programs. Peanut producers became eligible for other feder-
ally funded commodity programs, but these programs provided a lower 
price guarantee than the quota system.  Although not all ensuing changes to 
the peanut and tobacco sectors can be attributed to the buyouts, the quota 
terminations were clearly landmark events that shaped many of the structural 
changes that followed. Key findings of the study were:
•	Market forces guided structural changes. Adjustments to the buyouts—
largely in response to market forces—occurred rapidly, including changes 
in domestic and foreign demand, a movement toward larger operations in 
regions best adapted to production, and greater use of marketing contracts 
as a hedge against financial risk. 
•	Farms became fewer, but larger. The buyouts initiated a contraction 
in the number of peanut and tobacco farms, with smaller operators most 
likely to exit. The decline in farm numbers was especially large and swift 
for tobacco farmers, falling by more than half in the year after the buyout, 
while the number of peanut farms declined by a third after several years. 
The remaining producers farmed more peanut and tobacco acres, operated 
larger farms, and are generally in as good financial condition today as the 
average farmer preceding the buyout. By 2007, the average peanut farm 
planted two-thirds more peanuts (90 additional acres) than before the 2002 
buyout. The average burley tobacco farm had twice the burley acreage 
in 2007 that it had at the 2004 tobacco buyout (10.5 versus 5 acres), and 
average flue-cured tobacco acreage increased by more than 150 percent 
over the same period (from 32 to 84 acres). 5 
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•	Lower prices revived demand, particularly in export markets. Peanut 
prices fell by about 30 percent and tobacco prices by 20 percent shortly 
after the buyouts. Although peanut acreage and production initially 
declined in response, reduced prices stimulated domestic demand and 
contributed, along with a weaker dollar, to a rebound in U.S. exports 
and production and a sharp drop in imports. Tobacco production also 
fell substantially immediately after the buyout, and domestic use of U.S. 
tobacco leaf has remained weak. As with peanuts, however, lower prices 
and improved net exports have supported overall demand for U.S. tobacco 
leaf, particularly flue-cured tobacco. 
•	Planting flexibility spurred regional shifts in production areas. 
Without the geographic restrictions that the quotas placed on production, 
growers could farm in areas best suited to their crops, and the buyouts 
were followed by interstate and intrastate shifts in production regions. 
Peanut acreage became more concentrated in the Southeast, and every 
State experienced notable changes in peanut-farming areas. Flue-cured 
and burley tobacco became more concentrated in the two major tobacco-
producing States, flue-cured in North Carolina and burley in Kentucky. 
For peanuts, the shifts in area have been accompanied by steady growth in 
national average yields, whereas tobacco yields have remained steady.
•	Effects of buyouts on quota owners’ and producers’ decisions 
were mixed. The termination of the quota programs and the associ-
ated Government support prices affected active producers differently, 
depending on the extent to which they owned or leased quota rights. 
Producers of peanuts and tobacco who owned most of their quota faced 
reduced cash revenues due to lower prices, and a number of them may 
have ceased farming those crops. Although producers who primarily 
leased quota rights from others also faced lower prices, their net returns—
and production incentives—may have increased because they were free 
of the expense of renting quota. For the many quota owners who were not 
actively producing peanuts or tobacco, the primary impact was seeing their 
quota rental income replaced by a one-time cash infusion from the buyout.
•	Farmers increased their use of marketing contracts. After the buyouts, 
peanut and tobacco growers faced price risks from which they had been 
protected by price supports and other provisions of the quota programs. 
As a hedge against market uncertainties, more farmers turned to marketing 
contracts. In 2004, 2 years after the peanut quota buyout, 79 percent of 
peanut farmers had entered into contracts compared with 40 percent in 
2002. Similarly, in 2006, 2 years after the tobacco buyout, 71 percent of 
burley producers and 76 percent of flue-cured producers marketed their 
tobacco under contract, compared with 31 and 47 percent in 2004.
How Was the Study Conducted?
This report draws on recent ERS reports and other literature on the peanut 
and tobacco buyouts, and on data drawn from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service, the Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), and other data sources. The ARMS 
collects data on the financial conditions and production practices of farm 
businesses for specific years and contains survey data on field-level produc-
tion practices, farm business accounts, and farm households.6 
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Introduction
Elimination of Federal Peanut and  
Tobacco Quota Policies Spurred  
Significant Structural Change
Peanut and tobacco growers have become more directly exposed and 
responsive to market forces.
Until recently, peanuts and tobacco were among a small group of U.S. 
commodities regulated by marketing quotas. Similar to the sugar and dairy 
programs still in effect, the peanut and tobacco marketing quota programs 
were established during the 1930s to support and stabilize growers’ incomes. 
Although the programs provided dependable short-term expectations about 
prices and output, they tempered growers’ ability to adapt to longer term 
market forces by discouraging economies of scale, restricting production 
location, and distorting trade. The 2002 Farm Act and the Fair and Equitable 
Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 eliminated longstanding price support programs 
and brought about structural change in the peanut and tobacco leaf industries. 
The elimination of the marketing quotas is commonly referred to as a 
“buyout” because quota owners—those with the right to sell the commodity 
at a regulated support price—were financially compensated for the loss of 
an asset (quota ownership). Peanut quota owners received buyout payments 
of around $1.3 billion, funded by the Federal Government, whereas tobacco 
quota owners and active producers receive a total of $9.6 billion over 10 
years from assessments on tobacco product manufacturers and importers. 
Peanut farmers then became eligible for the same type of commodity 
support programs—marketing loans, direct payments, and countercyclical 
payments—available to producers of corn, soybeans, cotton, and other crops, 
while tobacco producers did not.
For producers of the two commodities, the quota elimination represented 
a striking policy change. For most other crops, the earlier introduction of 
planting flexibility provisions, and the decoupling of most Government 
support tied to production of specific commodities, had already fostered a 
greater market orientation, especially since the 1996 Farm Act. However, 
peanut and tobacco producers avoided a substantial overhaul of their 
programs until it became clear that high prices and global competition 
were causing declining market shares in domestic and/or export markets. 
The threat of lower demand, along with high production costs, made long-
term operation of the programs as “no net cost” (i.e., self-paying, without 
Government expenditures) less viable.1
The buyouts were enacted in response to many economic factors that were 
primarily linked to global competition. For peanuts, lower priced imports 
had made inroads in the domestic market as a result of trade treaties, and 
producers faced eventual reductions to their quota allocations or lower 
support prices. U.S. tobacco producers contended with global competition 
from lower cost foreign producers, which led to falling global demand for 
U.S. tobacco cigarettes and leaf and an increased share of foreign leaf in U.S. 
cigarette production. The reduced demand resulted in lower annual marketing 
1By law, the peanut and tobacco mar-
keting quota programs were meant to 
operate without any direct government 
payments to producers. Supply limita-
tions supported producer prices, so the 
marketing quota programs acted as a 
transfer from consumers—rather than 
all taxpayers—to producers.7 
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quota levels. In addition, under the quota systems, growers were subject to 
limits on quantities that could be marketed and geographical restrictions 
on production. This made it difficult for new operators to enter the market 
and for efficient producers to expand in order to reduce average production 
costs.2 In terminating the quota and price support programs, the buyouts also 
eliminated geographical restrictions on production.
Although not all ensuing changes to the peanut and tobacco sectors can 
be attributed to the buyouts, they clearly represented landmark events that 
guided many of the structural changes that followed. Peanut and tobacco 
producers were not previously immune to market forces, but decisions on 
whether to continue, reduce, or drop out of production—or even to begin 
production for the first time—can now be based more on market-determined 
net returns from alternate crop choices, without any geographical restrictions. 
Initially, the buyouts induced lower prices and a contraction of peanut and 
tobacco acreage, but recent market developments, regional shifts, and farm 
consolidation suggest that the buyouts and planting flexibility have enhanced 
overall efficiency.
2See Rucker, Thurman, and Sumner 
(1995) for an analysis of how this af-
fected tobacco production.
What Were Quotas?
Prior to the buyout legislation, tobacco and peanut producers were under marketing quota systems, 
which gave the quota owners the exclusive right to sell a set amount of their commodity at or 
above the support price within a geographic area. Tobacco producers without quota could not sell 
the commodity, while peanut producers without quotas faced certain marketing restrictions. Thus, 
quotas limited the supply that could be brought to market. Quota was essentially an asset that 
could be owned and used by producers or leased from owners who no longer produced peanuts or 
tobacco. Absentee owners obtained quota either through inheritance or retention of a quota if they 
quit farming, but they could not obtain it through purchases because quota could be sold only to 
active producers. 
Quotas often limited production to specific geographic regions. Quotas for flue-cured and burley 
tobacco were assigned to specific counties in their respective growing regions and were not usually 
transferable. Only in Tennessee were burley quotas allowed to be transferred across counties within 
the State. Before 1962, tobacco acreage was limited through allotments assigned only to farms in 
operation at the time the Agricultural Act of 1930 was enacted. Quota was tied to the land, as only 
individuals owning or renting allotment land could grow tobacco leaf. After 1962, farmers could 
purchase or rent quota allotments without having to farm the traditional allotment land, although 
there were restrictions on the distance that allotments could be transferred. Many quotas applied 
only within the county or State of the allotment holder. The tobacco quota system applied to most 
types of tobacco, but minor tobacco-producing States, such as Maryland and Pennsylvania, did not 
participate in the Federal marketing quota system.
After 1981, the peanut program allowed nonquota holders in any location to produce peanuts for 
export or crush, but restrictions on transferring peanut quotas confined most production to areas 
originally granted quota acreage in the 1940s. The 1996 Farm Act loosened restrictions on peanut 
quota transfers, allowing up to 40 percent of quota production to be transferred across county 
lines, but transfers across State lines were generally not allowed, except from adjacent counties in 
different States.8 
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3These two types of tobacco account 
for about 90 percent of U.S. tobacco 
production.
4For peanut cost and return data for 




5During 1999-2001, total peanut pro-
duction averaged 3.79 billion pounds 
annually, about 37 percent greater than 
the quota level of 2.36 billion pounds.
Objectives of Marketing Quotas
The Peanut and Tobacco Quota Programs 
Were Intended To Elevate and Stabilize  
Farm Prices
Marketing quotas limited the supply of peanuts and tobacco, and a 
Government loan program supported prices.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) historically has facilitated 
price support programs for a number of crops, including peanuts, tobacco, 
and sugar, as well as for dairy. For peanuts and tobacco, support programs 
were intended to maintain high and stable farm prices by limiting supply and 
matching it with anticipated demand, at a price at or above a predetermined 
level. To accomplish this goal, both peanuts and tobacco were governed by 
marketing quotas, and prices were underpinned by loan programs operated by 
USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). 
The national quota levels for these commodities were adjusted each year 
based on anticipated demand and were set so that prices would match or 
exceed the loan rates established by the CCC. For peanuts, quotas applied 
only to domestic “food use” (e.g., peanut butter and snacks) demand, whereas 
quotas for flue-cured and burley tobacco leaf—the two main tobacco types 
subject to quotas—applied to anticipated demand from both domestic use 
and exports.3 Once the annual quota level was determined, USDA distrib-
uted quotas to peanut and tobacco quota owners with a history of production, 
based on their share of quota ownership (Womach, 2004). Restrictions were 
established to limit transfers of quota rights to other counties. Limitations 
on peanut production were less binding than for tobacco because nonquota 
(“additional”) peanuts could be produced and sold, without restriction, as 
long as they were exported or crushed for oil and animal feed. 
USDA loan rates for quota peanuts—amounting to $610 per short ton during 
1996-2001—were typically well above operating costs and were above 
prevailing international prices, giving quota holders better per acre returns 
than other crops and strong incentives to maximize their use of quota rights.4 
Producers not possessing quota rights were guaranteed a lower loan rate of 
$132 per ton in 2001/02, but typically grew peanuts under contract for export 
at world prices (ranging from $320 to $460 per ton) and responded primarily 
to demand in foreign markets.5 
Producers of burley and flue-cured tobacco leaf were also supported with 
nonrecourse loans that guaranteed them a minimum price. If buyers at 
tobacco leaf auctions were unwilling to pay a price that exceeded the loan 
rate, the price stabilization cooperative would buy the tobacco at the loan 
rate. The cooperative stored the tobacco leaf and later sold it to repay the loan 9 
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6As mandated by 7 U.S.C 1445, Title 7, 
which authorizes the support price to be 
calculated as the 5-year olympic mov-
ing average of prices and the change in 
the annual index for producer costs. For 
U.S. Code 1445.Title 7: Agriculture, 
see http://vlex.com/vid/19271264.
7Prior to 1982, general tax revenues 
were used to cover CCC losses on 
tobacco. Congress passed the No-
Net-Cost Tobacco Act in 1982, which 
eliminated the taxpayer subsidy, with 
the exception of administrative costs 
(Womach, June 2004, updated  
December 31, 2005).
8Government payments were made to 
offset losses on tobacco loan inventory 
in 1983 and 1999 (Womach, March 
2004). 
principal with interest. In 2004, the loan rates were $1.69 per pound for flue-
cured and $1.87 per pound for burley tobacco.6 
Both the peanut and tobacco programs were operated on a “no-net-cost” basis 
to taxpayers.7 To cover any shortfalls between market prices and loan rates, 
assessment fees were placed, if necessary, on producers and buyers to recoup 
losses on loan repayments to the CCC.8 The fee was intended to ensure that 
the Federal Government and the taxpayer did not subsidize tobacco or peanut 
sales directly. 10 
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9Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1933 granted allowances 
for import restrictions on agricultural 
commodities covered by price support 
programs, in the form of import quotas 
and tariffs.
Market Pressures That Led to the Quota Buyouts
International Competition Weakened 
Marketing Quota Programs
Competitively priced foreign substitutes and “no-net-cost to the 
Government” provisions undermined the sustainability of the peanut and 
tobacco programs.
Although the experiences were not entirely parallel, a common factor precipi-
tating the peanut and tobacco buyouts was pressure, or the threat of pressure, 
from international competition. The prospect of increased imports was an 
important consideration when the peanut marketing quota system was ended 
in 2002. Pressure from global competition, especially from Brazil—combined 
with growers’ limited ability to respond to changing market conditions—
was a central factor leading to the tobacco buyout. Nevertheless, several key 
differences distinguished the evolving patterns of trade and overall demand 
for the two commodities and the implications of these patterns for the 
sustainability of the quota programs. The United States was an importer and 
exporter of both peanuts and tobacco, and thus trade was an important deter-
minant of quota levels, which were subject to annual adjustments based on 
anticipated demand. However, the criteria for establishing quota levels and 
import tariff regimes affected each commodity differently.9 
For peanuts, the marketing quota was based exclusively on anticipated 
domestic “food use” demand, which had been relatively stable. So, unlike 
tobacco, the annually determined quota did not depend on the ability to 
competitively sell peanuts abroad. The peanut program allowed exports of 
nonquota peanuts at market-determined rates. However, because U.S. peanut 
prices for domestic food use were supported at well above international 
levels, import restraints were essential to supporting domestic prices and 
maintaining a stable level of quota production. 11 
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Tobacco, in contrast, had been more exposed to international competition, 
through both exports and imports. A widening price gap between foreign and 
domestic leaf prices meant a decline in exports, a shift to overseas produc-
tion, and a loss of domestic market share to imports from foreign producers. 
Since tobacco quota levels were based on combined domestic and export 
demand, they were subject to the effects of reductions in both foreign market 
share and domestic leaf demand.
In both cases, increased competition from foreign producers would likely 
require the U.S. Government to reduce  the quota levels and/or lower the 
quota loan  rates if  the programs were to be maintained as “no-net-cost to the 
Government” programs.12 
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10Without import restrictions, unsold 
domestic quota peanuts would likely 
have been forfeited to the Commodity 
Credit Corporation. Since the market-
ing quota was meant to operate at “no-
net-cost” to the government under the 
1996 Farm Act, large forfeitures would 
have required either cuts in the domes-
tic marketing quota level or an eventual 
reduction of the quota loan rate under 
new legislation. For more information, 
see Skully (1999), Skinner (1999), and 
Becker (1999).
11The 1994 WTO agreement (still in 
effect as of October 2009) allows lower 
tariff peanut imports of 116 million 
pounds (about 6 percent of domestic 
food use at the time of the buyout). 
12Peanut butter is covered under a 
separate TRQ.
13For more detail on the new types 
of government support and projected 
government outlays, see Dohlman and 
Livezey (2005) and Dohlman, Hoff-
man, Young, and McBride (2004).
Market Pressures That Led to the Quota Buyouts
The Peanut Buyout Was Precipitated by 
Trade Agreements That Opened the Market 
to Imports
The peanut quota program did not give producers flexibility to cope with the 
threat of increased imports.  
The overhaul of the peanut quota program in 2002 was likely influenced 
by the recognition that policy change was unavoidable due to trade agree-
ments that had begun to liberalize U.S. peanut imports (Dohlman & Livezey, 
2005). Until 1994, U.S. trade restrictions capped peanut imports at a very low 
level, well below 1 percent of domestic consumption. However, under the 
separate North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements signed in the mid-1990s, the United States 
opened its market to gradually increasing peanut imports with the introduc-
tion of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). TRQs replaced purely quantitative limits on 
peanut imports, and, in this case, opened trade by allowing a larger amount of 
U.S. consumption to be met by low-tariff (“within-quota”) imports. Imports 
beyond that level are still restrained with much higher (“over-quota”) tariff 
rates. 
At the time of the buyout, the higher “over-quota” tariff rates continued to 
protect most of the domestic market, and imports had not yet led to reduc-
tions in the U.S. marketing quota level for peanuts (fig. 1a).10 However, the 
fast import growth prior to 2002 indicated that further relaxation of import 
barriers could reduce the demand for domestically produced peanuts (fig. 
1b). This issue was particularly relevant under the NAFTA accord, which 
was entirely phasing out tariffs on Mexican peanuts.11 Mexico was a rela-
tively minor peanut producer, with output equal to 6 percent of U.S. produc-
tion in 2001/02; however, the incentive to increase production and export 
lower priced peanuts to the United States was recognized as a threat to the 
future viability of the U.S. marketing quota program. U.S. commitments 
to enter into other trade agreements, along with rising imports of peanut-
containing products not covered by TRQs, also created incentives to change 
the domestic support program.12 These competitive pressures—and the addi-
tional Government support made available to peanut producers by the 2002 
Farm Act—facilitated the acceptance of policy change by many growers.13 
Following the 2002 peanut buyout, peanut imports fell sharply as the price of 
U.S. peanuts became more competitive.13 
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Figure 1a
Before the buyout, the marketing quota level for peanuts was 
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14A duty drawback provision allows 
most of the duty to be refunded if the 
same leaf is re-exported as product 
(e.g., cigarettes); source: http://www.
ers.usda.gov/publications/tbs/may07/
tbs26201/tbs26201.pdf. The United 
States has never filled more than 80 
percent of the overall TRQ, but imports 
from Brazil—which has the largest 
TRQ allocation—had been filling its 
quota level of 80,000 metric tons when 
the buyout was enacted (USITC, 2007).
15The 1998 Master Settlement Agree-
ment (MSA) required that cigarette 
manufacturers reimburse States for 
their health care costs caused by smok-
ing (Tiller, 2002) and that cigarette 
manufacturers address the negative 
economic impacts the agreement 
would have on tobacco producers and 
quota owners. As a result, Phase II of 
the agreement was created in 1999, 
requiring that participating cigarette 
manufacturers pay $5.15 billion over 
12 years into the National Tobacco 
Growers’ Settlement Trust Fund, to be 
dispensed directly to quota owners and 
tobacco producers.
Market Pressures That Led to the Quota Buyouts
Tobacco Faced Challenges on Many Fronts
Declining domestic and foreign demand had reduced tobacco quotas, with 
further cuts likely.   
While the peanut buyout was precipitated largely by the anticipation of 
increased imports and the prospect of declining quotas and/or support prices, 
the tobacco program had been confronting and adjusting to trade, demand, 
and cost pressures for many years preceding the buyout. Declining demand 
for U.S. tobacco leaf had already led to sharp reductions in tobacco quota 
levels, and the sector faced the prospect of further reductions. 
Demand for U.S.-produced tobacco leaf was hurt by developments both 
in the United States and abroad. Exports of U.S. tobacco leaf fell mainly 
due to widening price differences and narrowing quality between U.S. 
and foreign tobacco. U.S. tobacco leaf was more expensive than foreign 
leaf, but U.S. price premiums were frequently attributed to higher quality. 
However, the quality of foreign tobacco had increased even as the price gap 
between U.S. and foreign tobacco leaf rose. New manufacturing processes 
also allowed lower quality tobacco to be used in cigarettes. Reduced foreign 
demand lowered the quantity of U.S. flue-cured and burley exports by 28 
percent between 1997 and 2004. The same factors caused U.S. cigarette 
manufacturers to increase the share of foreign tobacco in their products. In 
2004, foreign tobacco comprised nearly 60 percent of U.S.-manufactured 
cigarettes, compared with 38 percent in 1995. U.S. cigarette manufacturers 
began importing a large share of the leaf used in manufacturing in the early 
1990s, which led the United States to implement a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for 
tobacco in 1995. Under this TRQ, imports above a certain level are subject to 
a 350-percent duty.14 
U.S. cigarette exports also began to decline after the mid-1990s, and 
domestic leaf demand was hurt by health concerns associated with smoking, 
public smoking restrictions, and rising retail cigarette prices, which lowered 
demand for cigarettes in the United States. Retail prices climbed as a result 
of higher Federal, State, and local excise taxes and the enactment of the 1998 
Master Settlement Agreement.15 The declining demand for U.S. tobacco leaf, 
along with higher support prices, led to further reductions in tobacco quota 
levels. As a result, the national marketing quota (“effective quota”) for burley 
fell 54 percent and the quota allotment for flue-cured leaf fell 47 percent 
between 1996 and 2004 (fig. 2). 15 
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16According to ERS tobacco cost of 
production accounts, the opportunity 
cost of using land and quota rose sub-
stantially from 1996 to 2004, on a dol-
lar per hundredweight basis, for both 
burley and flue-cured tobacco (source: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/costsan-
dreturns/data/history/Toba/H-USToba.
xls). In Reaves’s update (2001), an 
agricultural extension agent estimated 
that quota rental rates rose 65 percent 
between 1997 and 2001 (http://gov-
info.library.unt.edu/tobacco/_PRept-
disc/00000048.htm).
17Financial assistance from various 
sources likely allowed a number of less 
efficient growers to continue farming 
until the buyout. One source was the 
$5.15 billion trust fund established 
by Phase II of the Master Settlement 
Agreement. Additionally, several emer-
gency assistance laws enacted by Con-
gress, such as tobacco loss payments, 
provided $860 million to tobacco 
growers (P.L 106-224, P.L. 106-76, P.L 
107-25, and P.L. 108-7). Finally, be-
cause the financial solvency of the CCC 
nonrecourse support loan program was 
in jeopardy, Congress directed the CCC 
to assume all financial losses of the 
program in 1999, at a cost of approxi-
mately $625 million (P.L 106-387). See 
Womach (March, 2004).
Declining quota led to additional pressures as sharp reductions in tobacco 
quota led farmers to bid more to rent quota in order to maintain sufficient 
acreage to cover their investments in tobacco-related farm machinery, equip-
ment, and buildings.16 This pushed up quota rental rates, which further 
increased prices and lowered global competitiveness. Input costs, such as 
for labor, also rose throughout much of agriculture and lowered the returns 
from crop sales.17 Rising labor costs were especially of concern to tobacco 
producers because labor constitutes a relatively large proportion of tobacco 
production expenses. Ultimately, price pressures tied to declining domestic 
and export demand and improved foreign quality, along with cost pressures 
associated with acquiring quota rights, led many growers to support an end to 
the tobacco program.
Sources: Export and domestic disappearance data are from the Tobacco Outlook, ERS, USDA, TBS-263, Oct. 2007.  Import 
data are from the U.S. Tobacco Import Update 2005/06, ERS, USDA, TBS-262-01. Effective quota data are from Tobacco 
Outlook, ERS, USDA, TBS-258, May 2005. 
Note: The sum of domestic disappearance and exports is the usage of U.S,-produced tobacco leaf, while the sum of domestic 
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Figure 2
Declining domestic and export demand for U.S. tobacco leaf from 1996 to 2004 led to 
quota reductions for burley and flue-cured tobacco
Imports Exports Effective quota Domestic disappearance16 
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18Base acres are the peanut acres eli-
gible for some Government commodity 
programs. For more information on 
peanut program and other commodity 
provisions of the 2002 Farm Act and 
revisions enacted in the 2008 Farm  
Act, see the Title I provisions in:  
“The 2008 Farm Bill Side-By-Side 
Comparison,” http://www.ers.usda.gov/
FarmBill/2008/. Definitions of specific 
farm policy terms can be found at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ 
FarmPolicy/glossary.htm.
Provisions of the Quota Buyouts
Payments Went to Peanut and Tobacco 
Quota Owners, With Additional Payments  
to Tobacco Growers
Provisions of the peanut and tobacco buyouts differed in important respects.
Although the peanut and tobacco buyout programs were similar in intent, 
they contrasted notably in their structure, financial size, and Government 
support. These differences were most evident in the total size of payments, 
the method of dispersing payments to quota owners and/or farmers, and the 
source of funds for the buyout payments. A comparison of financial and 
other aspects of the two buyout programs provides insights into subsequent 
adjustments at the aggregate and farm level in each sector. 
The Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 eliminated tobacco 
quotas and price supports effective in 2005, but provided 10 years of buyout 
and transition payments, which were convertible to a lump sum. The 2002 
Farm Act included buyout payments to peanut quota owners only, but also 
instituted a new marketing loan program and provisions allowing producers 
to receive new types of support, such as direct and countercyclical payments 
tied to peanut base acreage.18 Whereas only quota owners received payments 
in the peanut buyout, the tobacco buyout program provided buyout transi-
tion payments, at different rates, to both quota owners and active producers 
leasing or renting quota. The source of buyout payments for peanuts and 
tobacco were also different. Peanut buyout payments (and the new forms 
of Government assistance) were funded by the Federal Government, while 
tobacco payments were funded from assessments on tobacco product manu-
facturers and importers. 17 
The Post-Buyout Experience: Peanut and Tobacco Sectors Adapt to Policy Reform / EIB-60 
Economic Research Service / USDA
19With relatively minor changes, the 
peanut provisions of the 2002 Farm Act 
were continued in the new farm legisla-
tion enacted in 2008.
  20The direct payment rate on peanuts 
is $36 per ton for 2002-12, while 
countercyclical payments range from 
$0 to $104 per short ton, depending on 
market prices.
Provisions of the Quota Buyouts
The Buyouts Included New Government 
Support for Peanuts
The peanut buyout program ended traditional price supports in exchange for 
new types of Federal assistance. 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Act) 
eliminated the marketing quota program for peanuts, allowing (without any 
geographic limitations) all producers to sell their peanuts in the domestic 
market for food use. Those owning quota in 2001 were compensated for the 
loss of the quota asset value, with buyout payments spanning 5 years. Quota 
owners, regardless of whether they had farmed or rented out quota, were 
eligible either to receive payments in annual installments of $220 per short 
ton ($0.11 per pound) for quota during fiscal years 2002-06 or to take a lump-
sum payment in a year that they specified. No payments were authorized to 
peanut farmers who did not own quota. The total cost of the buyout payments 
amounted to about $1.3 billion, funded entirely by the Federal Government.
In addition to the quota buyout, peanut producers became eligible—starting 
with the 2002/03 peanut crop—for the same kinds of Government commodity 
program payments available to producers of other crops, such as corn, 
soybeans, and cotton. Most significantly, these forms of assistance included 
a new marketing assistance loan program and fixed direct payments and 
countercyclical payments on newly defined peanut base acreage.19  These 
programs operate as follows:
Marketing Assistance Loans
Marketing loans provide short-term liquidity until the farmer’s crop is 
marketed and a guaranteed minimum revenue for production. Since the 2002 
Farm Act, a national average marketing loan rate of $355 per ton have been 
available to all peanut producers. While well below the $610 per ton for quota 
peanuts under the old system, it is significantly above the $132 per ton loan 
rate previously available for nonquota peanuts. 
Direct and Countercyclical Payments
To receive direct and countercyclical payments, peanut producers are required 
to establish peanut base acreage and payment yields from their farm produc-
tion history. It does not matter whether they produced quota or nonquota 
(“additional”) peanuts.20 Because these benefits are tied to historical produc-
tion levels on specific plots of land rather than current production, farmers’ 
cropping decisions are more flexible and aligned to market incentives, such as 
prospective returns from alternative crop choices. Most peanut producers—
covering about 96 percent of eligible land—elected to enroll their peanut base 
acres in the new program following the buyout. 18 
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21Total assessments are $10.1 billion. 
The additional $500 million was used 
to compensate grower cooperatives and 
for surplus tobacco disposal. Assess-
ments began in 2005 (based on fourth-
quarter 2004 market activity) and will 
continue for 10 years.
22Tobacco producers who owned their 
own quota would receive a total of $10 
per pound. When the tobacco quota 
was specified in farm acreage allot-
ments, the number of pounds owned 
was calculated by taking the 2002 basic 
farm acreage allotment and multiplying 
by the average county yields for 2001, 
2002, and 2003. The number of pounds 
produced was calculated by multiply-
ing the 2002 effective farm acreage 
allotment by the average farm yield for 
2001, 2002, and 2003. The $3 payment 
per pound for tobacco produced was 
prorated if the tobacco producer did not 
produce tobacco in all 3 years.
Provisions of the Quota Buyouts
The Tobacco Buyout Program Included 
Payments to Quota Owners and Producers, 
but No Future Federal Support
However, tobacco buyout payments were larger and spread among more 
recipients than were peanut buyout payments.
The Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 ended U.S. tobacco 
price supports and quotas and created the Tobacco Transition Payment 
Program (TTPP). Beginning with the 2005 production season, restrictions 
were removed on the amount of tobacco that could be sold, geographic 
restrictions on production were eliminated, and compensation was provided 
for quota owners and renters. Payments are funded from $9.6 billion in 
assessments on tobacco product manufacturers and importers, based on their 
market share.21 The tobacco buyout program eliminated an estimated $2 
billion that tobacco growers and quota owners would have received from 
2005 to 2010 from Phase II of the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) 
(Womach, 2005). Pennsylvania and Maryland tobacco producers also lost the 
right to further Phase II payments, even though they did not participate in the 
tobacco program and were not eligible for Federal quota buyout payments 
(see section “Other Tobacco Buyout Experiences,” pp. 42-43).
Unlike the provisions for peanut producers, no new commodity provi-
sions were established for tobacco producers. Tobacco producers and quota 
owners receive 10 equal annual payments that began in 2005, with quota 
owners receiving a total of $7 per pound (or $.70 per pound per year) and 
active producers receiving an additional $3 per pound in transition payments 
(Womach, 2005).22 Tobacco producers owning and using quota could receive 
a total of $10 per pound. Growers and quota owners were permitted to make 
arrangements with financial institutions to receive a discounted lump-sum 
buyout payment rather than receiving payments over 10 years.19 
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26The figures presented do not take into 
account the prospect that rental rates, 
and the overall value of owning quota, 
may have declined if the support prices 
or marketing allotments were reduced.
23Note that not all peanuts were pro-
duced under quota. The figure given 
here for peanuts is based on the quota 
level (2.36 billion pounds) and loan 
rate ($0.305/pound) in effect during 
1999-2001.
24For WTO domestic support provi-
sions, see http://www.ers.usda.gov/
Briefing/WTO/domsupport.htm.
25Brown, Rucker, and Thurman (2007) 
estimated that the economic rents as-
sociated with the ownership or rental 
revenues from flue-cured tobacco quota 
(not burley) were $274 million in 2003.  
The authors also present several dif-
ferent perspectives, without judgment, 
on the “appropriate level of compensa-
tion.”
Although tobacco producers did not become eligible for new forms of 
Government support, total transfers to the tobacco sector from the buyouts 
alone exceed those to the peanut sector by a large margin, approximately $9.6 
billion for tobacco versus $1.3 billion for peanuts. As a rough comparison, 
the tobacco buyout payments were equivalent to 5.7 times the 3-year average 
annual value of all tobacco production leading up to the buyout (2002-04), 
whereas the total buyout for peanuts of $1.3 billion amounted to 1.8 times 
the annual value of quota peanut production during the 3 years 1999-2001.23 
Measured another way, the value of the peanut price support program—
based on a fixed reference price reported to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)—was estimated as ranging between $303 and $350 million annu-
ally between 1996 and 2001.24 By this accounting, the buyout payments 
were equivalent to about 4 years of the estimated past value of quota. The 
United States did not report a similar price support measure for tobacco to the 
WTO.25 According to Orden (undated), the lump-sum $0.55/pound peanut 
buyout was equivalent to 24 years of average peanut quota rental revenues. 
For tobacco, quota buyout payments of $7 per pound for (non-operator) quota 
owners were equal to 16 years of average quota rental payments for flue-
cured tobacco and 21 years of payments for burley tobacco.2620 
The Post-Buyout Experience: Peanut and Tobacco Sectors Adapt to Policy Reform / EIB-60 
Economic Research Service / USDA
27Data from the 1995 Farm Costs and 
Returns Survey indicated that burley 
tobacco producers owned 44 percent of 
their effective quota and either cash- or 
share-rented the remainder (Foreman, 
2001). Data from the 1996 Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey indi-
cated that 34 percent of the flue-cured 
tobacco quota was owned by producers, 
while most of the remainder was cash-
rented. The percentage of quota owned 
and operated likely fell after these sur-
veys because producers tended to retain 
quota rights after retirement and rented 
them to active producers.
28Quota owners were not required to 
produce peanuts themselves, but to own 
the asset, they were required to have an 
ownership interest in a farm.
29The improvement in net returns 
assumes the quota rental rate was 
equivalent to the difference between the 
producers’ marginal cost of production 
and the price under the quota system 
(Brown, Rucker, and Thurman, 2007). 
Recall that tobacco producers who 
rented quota also received $3 per pound 
in transitional payments.
Provisions of the Quota Buyouts
Many Buyout Recipients Were Not  
Active Peanut or Tobacco Farmers
A majority of buyout payments went to recipients who were not producing 
peanuts or tobacco, but maintained ownership rights to market the crops at 
the quota support price.    
The majority of buyout payments went to quota owners who were not 
actively producing peanuts or tobacco, and the number of recipients was far 
greater than the number of active peanut and tobacco farmers. According 
to Womach (2005), about 358,000 non-operator landlords were eligible for 
tobacco quota buyout payments, along with almost 57,000 tobacco farm 
operators. Although most tobacco producers owned some quota, more than 
half of burley quota and about two-thirds of flue-cured tobacco quota was 
leased.27 
Peanut buyout payments were distributed among roughly 75,000 quota 
owners, most of whom did not produce peanuts.28 At the time of the buyout, 
there were fewer than 9,000 peanut farms. Some of those farms produced 
only nonquota (“additional”) peanuts for export or crush. Of the farms that 
did produce quota peanuts, the majority of production (about 60 percent) was 
accounted for by producers who cash- or share-rented quota rights. 
Consequently, for most quota owners, the buyout payments replaced an 
income stream from renting or leasing quota rights to other farm operators, 
but did not directly impact peanut or tobacco production. For producers 
renting quota from others, elimination of the quota represented a reduction 
in production costs that could more than compensate for the reduction in 
revenue caused by lower prices after the buyouts. In theory, this would lead 
to higher net returns and increased production among those who had previ-
ously rented quota. With the elimination of regional restrictions on produc-
tion, an expanding share of production would shift to counties or regions with 
lower production costs.29 Active producers who had owned much or all of 
their peanut or tobacco quota faced lower prices but had no offsetting cash 
savings on production costs, since they did not lease their quota. Producers 
whose costs of production exceeded prices after the buyout would most likely 
be the first to exit production. 21 
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Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Market Level Changes
Peanut Prices and Acreage Fell 
After the Buyout 
 
Average yields per acre have been higher since the buyouts, however, and 
both acreage and prices recently rebounded.
After marketing quotas were eliminated, the peanut sector initially became 
smaller, particularly after the first year (2002) of the new policy. Peanut 
prices in 2002 fell over 30 percent below the previous 5-year average. Large 
stocks from the previous year and anticipation of the buyout (enacted in 
May 2002) contributed to a 12-percent decline in planted acreage in 2002, 
and another decline in 2003 (fig. 3). However, the ensuing growth in peanut 
demand, along with more efficient production, appears to have stemmed a 
long-term decline in peanut acreage and stimulated yield improvements—
indicating that incentives to grow peanuts remain strong despite prices that, 
until recently, remained substantially below the pre-2002 Farm Act average.
Annual peanut acreage has generally remained below the pre-buyout 
level. However, production has been supported by improved yields, which 
have been a notable trend for the peanut sector since the buyout (see 
section “Shifts in Peanut Production Regions Reflected Increased Planting 
Flexibility,” p. 38). National average yields exceeded 3,000 pounds per acre 
only once prior to the buyout, but have exceeded that level four times since 
2002. Record yields and relatively high peanut plantings in 2008 contributed 
to the largest U.S. peanut crop to date. However, peanut-planted acreage fell 
sharply (by 28 percent) in 2009, a result of large stocks from the 2008 crop 
and low contract prices offered to farmers in 2009.
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Source: Quick Stats, National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA.
Figure 3
Annual peanut acreage and price, 1998/99-2008/0922 
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Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Market Level Changes
Peanut Production Initially Declined, but the 
Impact on Demand Was Ultimately Positive
Although peanut prices and acreage fell following the buyouts, domestic 
and foreign demand gained strength.
Before the buyout, domestic consumption had been on a slight upward trend 
since the mid-1990s (table 1). After 2002, lower peanut prices furthered this 
growth, making peanut products more competitive. For example, the price of 
peanut butter, the leading use for peanuts, trended downward between 2002 
and 2005, indicating that lower farm prices for peanuts were transmitted to 
the retail level. Increased demand was bolstered initially by an upswing in 
domestic demand for food-use peanuts (e.g., peanut butter and candy), and, 
more recently, by larger exports. However, peanut butter prices have since 
strengthened, which may explain a tapering off of growth in domestic food-
use demand (Data Resources, BLS).
Domestic peanut demand appears to have reached a plateau. However, 
foreign demand for U.S. peanuts—which averaged almost 30 percent lower 
in the first 4 years following the buyout than in the year before the buyout—
has been on an upward path since 2006, and exports are projected at 765 
million pounds in 2008/09, the highest volume in 13 years (fig. 4). U.S. 
exports have been supported by lower prices and by the general weakening 
of the dollar since 2002. Lower prices have also dampened import demand, 
which are well below pre-2002 levels despite regional trade agreements (i.e., 
NAFTA and the U.S. free trade agreement with the Dominican Republic and 
Central America) that continue to liberalize U.S. peanut imports.
1999/00 1997/98 2001/02 2003/04 2005/06 2007/08
* 2008/09 is estimated. 













Peanut consumption and exports respond to lower prices
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Table 1 
Peanut supply and disappearance, 1990/91-2008/091 
  Marketing  Planted    Domestic 
  year2  acres  Production3  food use  Exports  Imports  Crush  Yield  Price
     Pounds/  Cents/ 
  1,000’s  ------------------------------Million pounds--------------------------  acre  pound
1990/91  1,846  3,604  2,020  652  27  689  1,985  34.7
1991/92  2,039  4,927  2,207  1,002  5  1,103  2,444  28.3
1992/93  1,687  4,284  2,122  951  2  891  2,567  30.0
1993/94  1,734  3,392  2,088  533  2  670  2,008  30.4
1994/95  1,641  4,247  2,009  878  74  982  2,624  28.9
1995/96  1,538  3,461  1,993  826  153  999  2,282  29.3
1996/97  1,402  3,661  2,029  668  127  692  2,653  28.1
1997/98  1,434  3,539  2,099  682  141  544  2,503  28.3
1998/99  1,521  3,963  2,153  562  155  460  2,702  28.4
1999/00  1,535  3,829  2,233  743  180  713  2,667  25.4
2000/01   1,537  3,266  2,184  527  216  548  2,444  27.4
2001/02   1,541  4,277  2,225  700  203  693  3,029  23.4
2002/03  1,353  3,321  2,241  490  75  857  2,571  18.1
2003/04  1,344  4,144  2,456  516  38  536  3,159  19.3
2004/05  1,430  4,288  2,600  491  37  393  3,076  18.9
2005/06  1,657  4,870  2,616  491  32  542  2,989  17.3
2006/07  1,243  3,464  2,585  603  61  513  2,863  17.7
2007/08  1,230  3,672  2,517  750  73  496  3,073  20.5
2008/094  1,534  5,148  2,550  765  75  455  3,416  23.0
1As of August 12, 2009.
2Marketing year begins August 1st.  
3Units are farmer stock (in-shell) basis.  
42008/09 is preliminary.
Sources: National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA; Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA;
U.S. Department of Commerce.24 
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Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Market Level Changes
Tobacco Acreage, Production, and Price 
Initially Fell Post-Buyout
Flue-cured tobacco production has since rebounded, while burley tobacco 
production remains below pre-buyout levels.
The tobacco sector, like the peanut sector, experienced a decline in farm-
level prices, acreage, and production immediately following the buyout (fig. 
5; table 2). After the tobacco buyout, many farmers discontinued tobacco 
production, and those who remained were confronted by more uncertainty 
about the profitability of tobacco farming. Although producers no longer had 
to rent quota, they faced lower tobacco prices that reflected the absence of 
minimum price supports and quota rental payments. Prices initially fell more 
than 20 percent from 2004/05 to 2005/06 and have remained well below pre-
buyout levels. Preceding and directly following the buyout, many remaining 
producers held off making capital investments needed to significantly expand 
production. A reduction in the number of farms and lower prices led to a 
decline in harvested acreage of a third for burley leaf and a quarter for flue-
cured leaf between 2004 and 2005. 
As a result, burley and flue-cured tobacco leaf production dropped to 584 
million pounds in 2005, the lowest in decades. Production has increased 
since then, however, and is estimated at 701 million pounds for 2008. Prices 
remain considerably below those preceding the buyout, but renewed export 
growth has contributed to a modest trend of strengthening demand, particu-
larly for flue-cured tobacco.  Flue-cured tobacco acreage has increased 
steadily since 2005, returning to pre-buyout levels, and production in 2008 
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Source: Quick Stats, National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA; burley type 
31, flue-cured types 11-14.  25 
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Table 2 
Flue-cured tobacco, types 11-14, and burley tobacco, type 31: Acreage, yield, production, domestic  
disappearance, trade, and season average price, 1997/98-2008/09 (farm-sales weight)1 
Marketing  Acreage   Yield per  Disappearance  Net  Average price
year2  harvested  acre  Production  Total  Domestic  Exports  Imports  exports  per pound
  1,000 acres  Pounds  ---------------------------------------Million pounds--------------------------------------  Dollars
Flue-cured, types 11-14: 
1997/98  458.3  2,285  1047.2  876.8  534.8  342.0  176.5  165.5  1.72
1998/99  368.8  2,204  812.8  833.7  492.2  341.5  182.1  159.4  1.75
1999/00  303.8  2,162  656.8  698.7  434.8  263.9  157.5  106.4  1.73
2000/01  247.0  2,426  599.2  717.2  473.3  243.9  130.4  113.5  1.79
2001/02  238.1  2,432  579.1  664.9  385.3  279.6  179.7  99.9  1.85
2002/03  245.6  2,094  514.3  643.0  420.6  222.4  190.2  32.2  1.82
2003/04  233.4  1,957  456.8  522.5  306.8  215.7  290.8  -75.1  1.85
2004/05  228.4  2,283  521.4  526.2  337.5  188.7  107.6  81.1  1.84
2005/06  174.5  2,182  380.8  572.8  314.4  258.4  179.3  79.1  1.47
2006/07  213.1  2,095  446.4  557.3  310.5  246.8  220.6  26.2  1.49
2007/08  223.0  2,259  503.8  641.9  336.8  305.1  213.2  91.9  1.52
2008/09  223.0  2,239  499.3  3  3  3  3  3  1.75
Burley, type 31:
1997/98  335.3  1,934  648.5  556.1  379.2  176.9  139.9  37.0  1.88
1998/99  307.1  1,896  582.3  520.5  348.8  171.7  128.2  43.6  1.90
1999/00  303.6  1,829  555.3  416.1  276.6  139.5  178.6  -39.1  1.89
2000/01  185.4  1,957  362.8  666.0  523.7  142.3  170.0  -27.7  1.96
2001/02  164.4  2,032  334.1  385.2  244.7  140.5  220.2  -79.7  1.97
2002/03  157.7  1,861  293.5  369.6  220.6  149.0  191.7  -42.7  1.97
2003/04  152.3  1,850  281.8  309.8  136.1  173.7  217.5  -43.8  1.97
2004/05  153.2  1,908  292.3  327.5  98.3  229.2  187.3  41.9  1.99
2005/06  100.2  2,031  203.5  292.6  84.1  208.5  262.3  -53.8  1.56
2006/07  103.7  2,100  217.8  324.3  64.7  259.6  216.3  43.3  1.63
2007/08  106.3  2,033  216.1  247.4  55.3  192.1  161.0  31.1  1.60
2008/09  97.5  2,067  201.5  3  3  3  3  3  1.66
1Factors for converting tobacco stocks to farm weight taken from USDA/ Agricultural Marketing Service Tobacco Stock Report.  
2Flue-cured types 11-14 marketing year is July-June. Burley type 31 marketing year is October-September. 
3Data not available. 
Sources: Prepared by ERS-USDA, using data from USDA/National Agricultural Statistics Service Crop Production Report, U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Census Bureau, and USDA-ERS Tobacco Outlook, various years. 
the buyout, harvested burley tobacco acres remained well below the levels 
preceding the buyout, and  production was 16 percent lower in 2008 than the 
preceding 5-year average. Modest price increases for all tobacco in recent 
years likely reflect increased export demand and buyers’ desire to maintain 
domestic tobacco supplies, as well as inflationary pressures on production 
costs associated with higher prices for energy, chemicals, and hired labor. 26 
The Post-Buyout Experience: Peanut and Tobacco Sectors Adapt to Policy Reform / EIB-60 
Economic Research Service / USDA
Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Market-Level Changes
Domestic Tobacco Use Remains Weak, but 
Trade Outlook Is Improving
Domestic use lags, but lower prices and a weaker dollar have reversed the 
U.S. decline in net tobacco exports.
Despite the lower prices stemming from the buyout, domestic use of U.S.-
produced tobacco leaf has not increased. Domestic use of flue-cured tobacco 
for each of the post-buyout years has been flat or down compared with use in 
2004, while domestic use of burley tobacco has nearly disappeared. Domestic 
demand has been cut by the decline in per capita smoking rates, the large 
share of foreign tobacco that continues to be used in U.S.-manufactured ciga-
rettes, and an ongoing decline in U.S. cigarette exports. Although the price 
gap has narrowed, foreign flue-cured and burley prices remain well below 
U.S. prices (table 3).30 
A bright spot for U.S. tobacco growers has been renewed export demand 
and a generally more favorable net trade (exports minus imports) position. 
Spurred by lower prices, a weakening dollar, and a resulting decline in the 
price gap between U.S. and foreign producers, U.S. tobacco has become 
more competitive since the buyout (fig. 6). U.S. flue-cured exports averaged 
270 million pounds during 2005-07 compared with an average of 209 million 
pounds during 2002-04. For burley, exports averaged 220 million pounds 
during 2005-07, compared with an average of 184 million pounds during 
2002-04. Nearly 87 percent of burley tobacco was exported in 2006, while 
exports accounted for 48 percent of flue-cured tobacco disappearance. As a 
result, total disappearance of flue-cured tobacco has increased slightly since 
the buyout, while burley tobacco disappearance has remained flat.
U.S. imports of burley and flue-cured tobacco have remained relatively 
stable, so the share of foreign tobacco in U.S.-manufactured cigarettes has 
not declined substantially. In 2004, nearly 60 percent of the tobacco in U.S.-
manufactured cigarettes was imported, declining to 53 percent in 2005, 
the year after the buyout (ERS, Tobacco Outlook, Oct. 24, 2007, table 22). 
Nevertheless, the overall trade picture for both types of U.S. tobacco leaf has 
improved, with net exports stronger in the past several years compared with 
the immediate pre-buyout period.
30The price drop for tobacco leaf has 
not had a significant impact on domes-
tic cigarette demand, since the cost 
of tobacco leaf comprised only about 
2½ cents of the price per pack in 2003 
(Capehart).
Table 3 
The price difference between U.S. and foreign tobacco narrowed after the buyout
  Burley  Flue-cured
Country  2004  2005  2006  2007E  2004  2005  2006  2007E
  Dollars per kilogram
United States  4.38  3.49  3.61  3.71  4.07  3.30  3.42  3.48
Brazil  1.26  1.51  1.73  1.80  na  1.62  1.90  2.00
Argentina  1.55  1.22  1.24  1.30  1.43  1.37  1.45  1.67
E=Estimated.                  
na = not available.                 
Data source:  Universal Leaf Tobacco Company, Supply and Demand, Aug. 2007,  
Aug. 2006, Oct. 2005.  Note: no prices provided in the 2008 report. 27 
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Total tobacco production was also supported by increased demand for some 
specialized products, such as dark tobacco. (See box “Rising Demand for 
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Rising Demand for Dark Tobacco Softens the Impact  
of the Buyout as Acreage Increases 
With little competition from foreign dark tobacco producers and rising domestic 
demand, U.S. dark tobacco producers experienced smaller impacts from the tobacco 
buyout than burley and flue-cured tobacco producers. Domestic demand for dark 
tobacco rose, and prices fell less than for other tobaccos because dark tobacco is 
used in snuff, which has gained popularity as smoking restrictions have increased. 
The domestic consumption of smokeless tobacco, especially snuff, has increased 
steadily since the 1980s as bans against smoking in the workplace have proliferated 
(Bickers, March 15, 2006). Rising demand, along with comparatively high prices 
and improved yields, has led to increases in dark tobacco acreage. Dark tobacco 
accounts for a small share of U.S. tobacco production (3 percent in 2008), but 
acreage of dark tobacco expanded 67 percent between 2004 and 2008 compared 
with a 37-percent decline for burley tobacco and a 1-percent decline for flue-cured 
tobacco (NASS). The production regions for many of the dark tobacco types overlap 
with burley production regions, and some burley farmers in those regions may have 
switched to dark tobacco acreage because dark tobacco is more profitable (Snell, 
June 2008).28 
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31Contracting in this report refers to 
marketing contracts. Marketing con-
tracts are defined as verbal or written 
agreements between a contractor and 
a grower that set a price (or pricing 
mechanism) and an outlet for the com-
modity before harvest or before the 
commodity is ready to be marketed 
(Economic Research Service, USDA, 















Number of farms Acres per farm
Figure 7
After the buyouts, farm numbers declined, but average acreage climbed
Note: The number of acres refers only to peanuts, flue-cured tobacco, and burley tobacco 
per farm, respectively.
Source: Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), USDA, 2002-2007. 
Flue-cured farms Burley farms Peanut farms
Flue-cured acreage Burley acreage Peanut acreage
Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Farm-Level Changes
Buyouts Spurred Farm-Level Consolidation 
Increased competition and reduced regulation prompted a rapid 
consolidation of farms, with remaining producers operating larger farms. 
Changes in market-level indicators such as prices, production, and trade are 
shaped by the interaction between overall demand conditions and the aggre-
gated supply response of individual farmers. However, even with produc-
tion levels that are comparable to the immediate pre-buyout periods, the 
structure of the peanut and tobacco farm sectors have changed considerably 
due to farm exits, entry, and grower decisions to alter production levels and 
practices. The key considerations for growers in a post-buyout environment 
were whether peanut or tobacco farming could be profitable in a new, lower 
priced market and whether they could manage price and production risk. 
Many smaller scale producers exited peanut and tobacco production, finding 
that high production costs and price uncertainty made their operations nonvi-
able. The ensuing consolidation has created a farm structure characterized 
by fewer, but larger, peanut and tobacco farms that have household income 
levels averaging about the same as those for peanut and tobacco farms 
before the buyout (fig. 7; app. tables 1-4). Remaining producers increasingly 
engaged in contracting to manage price risk.3129 
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32In 2004, burley tobacco quota rental 
rates averaged an estimated $0.52 per 
pound, while flue-cured tobacco quota 
rental rates averaged an estimated $0.66 
per pound (authors’ calculation based 
on the historical relationship between 
quota rental rates and quota levels). 
The value (opportunity cost) of peanut 
quota was in the $80- to $90-per acre 
range during 1996-2001, which trans-
lates into about 3.5 cents per pound 
based on national average yields (ERS 
Costs and Returns, http://www.ers.
usda.gov/Data/CostsAndReturns/). In 
addition, tobacco producers may have 
seen some reduction in their market-
ing expenses since they were no longer 
paying a no-net-cost assessment fee. In 
2004, the no-net-cost fee was $0.01 per 
pound for burley and $0.05 per pound 
for flue.
Consolidation of tobacco and peanut farms has been motivated by increased 
domestic and overseas competition and the drive for economies of scale. 
Until the buyout, quotas and price supports kept prices relatively high, so 
producers could make a profit even on relatively small acreages. When the 
quotas ended, domestic producers had to increase their scale and lower their 
production costs to compete more successfully with other U.S. growers and 
foreign producers. By increasing acreage per farm, producers can spread 
their fixed costs over more acreage and obtain discounts on large purchases 
of inputs. These actions may have lowered the costs both per acre and per 
pound and helped large growers achieve economy of scale advantages. In 
addition, some producers benefited from a drop in cash outlays because 
discontinuation of marketing quotas eliminated quota rental payments, with 
producers who had rented most of their quota seeing the largest cost reduc-
tions.32 Growers who had previously rented quotas from multiple landlords, 
especially when it was spread among different counties, could realize cash 
savings by consolidating their farm operations on fewer fields over smaller 
distances. They could also save in management time because they no longer 
needed to locate landlords with rentable quotas or negotiate quota rental 
rates. 30 
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33Combining data from two surveys 
yields rough estimates of the percent-
ages of tobacco farmers who quit 
farming.
Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Farm-Level Changes
Tobacco Buyout Led to Rapid Exit  
From Tobacco Farming
Within a year of the buyout, 54 percent of tobacco growers had ceased 
production, with exits higher among flue-cured growers than burley growers.
Although overall tobacco production has been recovering—with lower but 
stabilizing burley acreage and rebounding flue-cured acreage—the 2004 
tobacco buyout marked a dramatic change that was followed by sudden and 
enduring changes to the structure of tobacco production at the farm level. 
Most notably, the number of tobacco farms swiftly declined, with many 
older tobacco growers choosing to retire and exit the market. The remaining 
farms tended to be larger (both in tobacco acreage and total farm acreage) 
and more diversified compared with the average tobacco farm preceding the 
buyout (app. tables 3 and 4).
The rapid decline in tobacco farms partly reflects the fact that many 
producers, especially older producers, anticipated the tobacco buyout and 
remained in production to be eligible for the buyout “transition” payments 
to active tobacco growers. Following the buyout, rising competition and 
uncertainty about the future of tobacco production increased the probability 
that less efficient tobacco producers would quit growing tobacco. Data from 
USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) indicate that 
about 27,000 (approximately 54 percent) of flue-cured and burley growers 
ceased production of these two crops in the year after the buyout, with the 
larger share of them flue-cured producers. However, farmers who previously 
produced flue-cured tobacco were more likely than burley growers to remain 
active producers of other commodities.
Burley Tobacco Farm Exits
According to the 2004 ARMS, about 39,000 farmers grew burley tobacco 
in 2004, but data from the 2005 ARMS indicate that the number of burley 
farmers had dropped to roughly 19,000 a year after the buyout. Combined 
data from the 2004 and 2005 ARMS suggest that 56 percent of the 2004 
burley tobacco growers quit farming burley a year after the buyout.33 A 
further breakdown of the data indicates that roughly 41 percent of the 2004 
burley producers quit farming altogether in 2005, while 15 percent continued 
to farm but did not produce burley (fig. 8). The remaining 44 percent of 
producers grew burley tobacco in both years. Roughly, 1,000 producers who 
grew burley tobacco in 2005 did not grow the crop in 2004. Without quota 
restrictions, producers outside the normal burley tobacco production regions, 
such as those in Pennsylvania, could and did grow burley. 
Flue-Cured Tobacco Farm Exits
Flue-cured tobacco producers were more likely to discontinue tobacco 
production because the residual returns per acre for flue-cured tobacco 
production had been lower than those for burley tobacco production for 31 
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One year after the buyout, flue-cured tobacco farmers were more likely 
than burley tobacco producers to discontinue tobacco production, but 
were less likely to discontinue farming
Data source:  2004 and 2005 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), USDA. 
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10 years preceding the buyout.34 Estimates from the 2004 ARMS show 
that about 11,000 producers grew flue-cured tobacco that year. ARMS data 
for 2004 and 2005 indicate that roughly 63 percent of the 2004 flue-cured 
tobacco producers quit producing flue-cured in the first year of the tobacco 
buyout (fig. 8). The remaining 37 percent continued to grow tobacco. Very 
few producers grew flue-cured tobacco in 2005 who had not done so in 2004, 
suggesting that few producers wanted to risk entering into flue-cured produc-
tion. The lack of new entrants indicates that flue-cured production remained 
in the traditional regions in the short term.
Although more of flue-cured producers discontinued tobacco production 
than burley producers, flue-cured producers were more apt to remain active 
farmers. In 2005, only 27 percent of the 2004 flue-cured producers retired 
from farming compared with 41 percent of burley tobacco producers—
probably due to flue-cured producers’ greater diversification in commodities 
and greater dependence on farm income. For example, flue-cured producers 
sold an average of 4.6 commodities and burley producers sold an average of 
4.1 in 2007 compared with 3.3 and 2.8 commodities in 2004, respectively. 
Dropping one commodity, such as tobacco, would not significantly change 
the income levels for most flue-cured farms because commodity diversifica-
tion generates income from—and spread risks over–several farm enterprises. 
In addition, flue-cured tobacco producers had larger farms, which tend to 
generate higher farm incomes and allow less time for operators to pursue off-
farm employment. With larger farms and their greater dependency on income 
from their farm operations, former growers of flue-cured tobacco were less 
likely to discontinue farming. 32 
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Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Farm-Level Changes
Increasing Tobacco Acreage per Farm  
Has Implications for Tobacco Production
Despite labor shortages, remaining tobacco farms grew in scale and 
household incomes held steady.   
Average tobacco acreage per farm increased after the buyout, more on farms 
producing flue-cured tobacco than on burley farms. Most of the increase 
in tobacco acreage per farm, at least initially, was due to smaller tobacco 
farmers dropping out, while larger farms were more likely to remain in 
operation. ARMS data show that the average burley tobacco farm harvested 
approximately 5 acres of burley in 1995, 5 acres in 2004, and over 10 acres 
in 2006 and 2007 (app. table 3). In 1996, farms producing flue-cured tobacco 
harvested 38 acres on average; by 2004, the year of the buyout, this had 
dropped to an average of 32 acres. Just 1 year later, the average was 47 acres 
per farm, and it rose to 84 acres by 2007 (app. table 4).
Increasing the tobacco acreage per farm to achieve economies of scale has 
had multiple consequences for tobacco producers. One of the challenges 
tobacco farmers face today is finding the labor to support the increased scale 
of production; tobacco production is very labor-intensive, with hired labor 
accounting for 30 percent of variable cash expenses for flue-cured tobacco 
production in 2004 and 42 percent of variable cash expenses for burley 
production.35 Snell (2007) estimates that 200 hours of labor per acre are 
needed to produce burley tobacco. In the past, many small tobacco opera-
tions were able to handle the workload by supplementing operator and family 
labor with hired local laborers. As tobacco acreage per farm increases, family 
labor and the supply of local residents willing to work with tobacco may no 
longer meet labor requirements. 
The increasing burley tobacco acreage per farm, combined with the difficul-
ties in finding workers, has increased producers’ interest in mechanization 
(Center for Tobacco Grower Research). One effect of the quotas had been 
to constrain the size of tobacco operations, indirectly discouraging use of 
new production technologies, since the quota limited the quantity that each 
producer could market. Without quotas, tobacco acreage per farm can be 
increased to levels that support mechanization of the intensive tobacco labor 
operations, but producers need sufficient acreage to spread purchase and 
maintenance costs to acceptable levels.33 
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The average total (farm and off-farm) household income per farm family 
did not rise significantly for flue-cured or burley tobacco producers after 
the tobacco buyout. However, farm income per family for flue-cured 
tobacco producers was somewhat higher in 2007, according to the ARMS 
data, compared with income for the 2004 producers. Producers of flue-
cured tobacco had more farm acreage and more tobacco acreage per farm 
in 2007 than in 2004. The higher acreages may have resulted in the higher 
average farm-based income for flue-cured producers in 2007. In contrast, the 
average farm income earned by burley tobacco producers in 2007 remained 
unchanged from the time of the buyout (app. table 3). 34 
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Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Farm-Level Changes
Peanut Farms Are Fewer, but Larger,  
Since the Buyout
The number of peanut farms declined by a third—somewhat more gradually 
than for tobacco—and average acreage increased by two-thirds.   
As with tobacco farms, peanut farms following the 2002 buyout have 
become fewer in number, but larger on average, in both peanut acreage and 
total operated acreage per farm (app. tables 1 and 2). According to ARMS 
data, the decline in the number of peanut farm operators was not as rapid as 
with tobacco, but by 2007, the number of farms had shrunk by nearly 3,000, 
or more than a third. However, as the number of farms fell, average peanut 
acreage per farm increased by two-thirds (by 90 acres) between 2002 and 
2007. Total operated cropland acreage per farm also became significantly 
larger—rising to more than 1,500 acres per farm in 2007 compared with just 
over 900 acres in 2002. 
Although the data are not conclusive, ARMS data indicate that the average 
(farm and off-farm) household income per farm family for peanut producers 
rose after the peanut buyout (app. table 2). The increase is tied mainly to a 
rise in farm income, indicating that remaining peanut farmers depend more 
on farm activities to support total household income than previously. This 
dependence may reflect the increasing scale of peanut farms, requiring more 
management and leaving less time for off-farm work. ARMS data indicate 
that between 2002 and 2007, the share of peanut farms operating in the 
largest sales class—farm sales over $500,000 annually—rose from 8 percent 
to 33 percent. The increase in scale and full-time management of peanut 
farms may also contribute to the growth in national average peanut yields. 
ARMS data also provide some perspectives on why peanut farming area 
shifted strongly from the Mid-Atlantic and Southwestern regions to the 
Southeast following the buyout. In 2004, U.S. peanut farmers were asked 
several policy-related questions as part of the 2004 ARMS data collec-
tion. The results showed that a larger percentage of peanut farmers in 
the Southeast expected to be farming the same peanut acreage in 5 years 
compared with peanut farmers in the Mid-Atlantic and Southwest. The 
Mid-Atlantic region had the smallest percentage of peanut farmers expecting 
to keep the same acreage and the most farmers who expected to stop 
producing peanuts compared with the other two regions. Peanut farmers in 
the Southwest indicated they were most likely to reduce peanut acreage, but 
very few planned to stop producing peanuts. The 2004 ARMS data also indi-
cate that a much larger share of farmers in the Mid-Atlantic felt that peanut 
production had become less profitable since the buyout than did farmers in 
the other two regions. A substantial majority of farmers in the Southwest 
felt that production had become more profitable since the buyout. Before 
the buyout, many of these growers produced “additional” peanuts (nonquota 
peanuts for export or crush) without CCC quota loans. 35 
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36 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/cost-
sandreturns/data/recent/Pean/ 
R-USPean.xls. See Data Resources,  
p. 53.
Peanut farmers’ expectations, as expressed in the 2004 ARMS, have largely 
been borne out. Prior to the buyout, peanut production was most profit-
able in the Mid-Atlantic region due to higher yields than in the other two 
regions (ERS cost-of-production accounts).36 However, peanut yields in 
the Mid-Atlantic region remained about the same after the buyout, while 
yields increased moderately in the Southeast and rose significantly in the 
Southwest. Profitability from peanut production declined in the Mid-Atlantic 
region as yields stagnated and prices declined, and peanut production is 
currently least profitable in the Mid-Atlantic.
Despite the shift in peanut-growing area toward the Southeast, ERS peanut 
cost-of-production data indicate that peanut production is now most profit-
able in the Southwest due to soaring peanut yields. This reflects the increased 
share of peanut production in the Southwest that is grown under irrigation, 
which rose from 64 percent to 86 percent between the 1995 and 2004 peanut 
surveys. With lower peanut prices after the buyout, it was difficult to main-
tain dryland peanut production in the Southwest, since yields tend to be 
higher on irrigated acreage. This explains the decline in total peanut acreage 
in the Southwest.36 
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37The use of contracting in U.S. agri-
culture has been a growing trend. Agri-
cultural contracts covered 41 percent of 
the value of agricultural production in 
2005, up from 36 percent in 2001 and 
28 percent in 1991 (MacDonald and 
Korb, 2008).
38For more information see MacDonald 
et al. (2004).
Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Farm-Level Changes
Peanut and Tobacco Growers Turned  
More to Contracting To Manage Risk  
After the Buyouts
Measured by both the percentage of farms and the value of production, the 
use of marketing contracts rose significantly for peanut and tobacco farmers. 
In agriculture, producers routinely use contracts to market their commodi-
ties.37 The contracts are agreements between farmers and other players in the 
marketing chain that specify, among other things, conditions of producing or 
selling an agricultural product. By combining market functions, contracting 
can reduce participants’ exposure to risk by specifying quality requirements, 
price, and quantities. The contractee (in this case, the farmer) assumes all 
risks of production, but shares price risk with the contractor.38 After the 
buyouts, and following the decline of tobacco auctions used to market 
tobacco leaf, growers selling on the spot market faced risks related to crop 
prices that were not present under Government price supports in the quota 
programs. As a result, peanut and tobacco producers increasingly relied on 
marketing contracts to control price risk and ensure that a market existed for 
their production (fig. 9).
Because farmers cannot adjust easily to changes in demand after planting 
investments are made, supplies from individual producers are often insen-
sitive to spot market price movements caused by large fluctuations in 
market demand or aggregate production. In the absence of minimum price 
supports—or with lower levels of support, in the case of peanuts—tobacco 
and peanut farmers faced more uncertainty after the buyouts about whether 
prices would be high enough to recover investment costs incurred during 
planting. In the new post-buyout environment, contracts offered a way to 
smooth production, control quality, and manage price risk.
Although marketing contracts were important in the production and supply 
of peanuts and tobacco before the buyout programs, the number of farms 
using these contracts significantly increased following the policy changes. In 
2004, 2 years after the peanut quota buyout, the share of peanut farms using 
marketing contracts for their peanut production had grown to 64 percent 
compared with 40 percent in 2002. Similarly, tobacco growers—who could 
no longer rely on minimum selling prices at tobacco auction—expanded 
their marketing contract use. By 2006, 71 percent of burley farms and 75 
percent of flue-cured farms marketed their tobacco under marketing contracts 
compared with 31 and 47 percent in 2004. ARMS data show that in 2007, the 
percentage of burley producers using tobacco marketing contracts declined, 
reversing what had been an upward trend, while the percentage of flue-cured 
producers using contracts stayed fairly stable.37 
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Percent of farms with marketing contracts1
Figure 9
Contracting increases following the buyouts
2002 2001 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1Refers to the share of farms using marketing contracts for the specified commodity.
Source: Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), USDA, 2000-2007.
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Tobacco buyout
In addition to a rising share of peanut and tobacco farms using marketing 
contracts after the buyouts, the value of production under contract also rose 
significantly. According to ARMS data, the proportion of peanut produc-
tion value under a marketing contract averaged 63 percent in the 5 years 
following the buyout (2003 to 2007), up from 24 percent in 2001. Similarly, 
the share of burley and flue-cured tobacco production value under marketing 
contracts was higher in the 3 years after the buyout than in the 3 years 
before: from 2005 to 2007, the average share of the annual burley tobacco 
value under marketing contract was 57 percent, compared with 32 percent 
during 2001-03, while the value of flue-cured tobacco production under 
contract rose to 85 percent from 68 percent. 38 
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39The USDA National Agricultural 
Statistics Service did not report State-
level peanut plantings for Mississippi 
until 2005.
Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Regional Shifts in Production
Shifts in Peanut Production Regions 
Reflected Increased Planting Flexibility
The buyouts gave peanut farmers flexibility to produce in areas where the 
soil, climate, and other conditions are better adapted to peanut crops—
leading to regional production shifts and rising yields.
While overall peanut acreage has fluctuated since the 2002 buyout, it appears 
that domestic and export demand have provided sufficient incentives to 
prevent further contraction of acreage. However, a major adaptation has been 
a significant change in production location, with shifts between and within 
each of the three main peanut-growing regions—a development related at 
least partly to the elimination of planting restrictions brought about by policy 
change. 
Regional and State Shifts in Peanut Acreage
Although acreage has declined sharply in the Southwest (Texas, Oklahoma, 
and New Mexico) and the Virginia-North Carolina region since 2002, plant-
ings in the Southeast (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina) have expanded considerably. The Southeast accounted for roughly 
75 percent of national plantings in 2008 compared with just over half imme-
diately preceding the buyout. 
In addition to peanut area shifts between regions, the relocation of produc-
tion within regions and individual States has been pronounced, reflecting the 
new mobility of peanut production. For example, figure 10—which maps 
percentage changes in average peanut acreage by county from the pre-Farm 
Act years (1998-2001) to 2005-07—shows a large decline in south-central 
Georgia, while growth in surrounding areas more than compensated for 
those losses. Production has also shifted in other States, with acreage gains 
in northern Florida and western Texas and losses in northern North Carolina, 
central Texas, and throughout Oklahoma and Virginia. Additionally, peanut 
acreage has declined in southeast Alabama, with production shifting into 
the southwest portion of the State. New peanut-farming States such as 
Mississippi now plant more acres than long-established peanut-producing 
States such as Oklahoma or New Mexico.39
Peanut Yields Improve as Producers Shift Location  
and Expand Operations
Major shifts within and between production regions have been associated 
with steady growth in national average peanut yields since the buyout. Data 
indicate that counties with good yield histories have been gaining area at 
the expense of counties with poorer performance and that national average 
peanut yields during 2003-08 improved by almost 450 pounds per acre, or 17 
percent, compared with yields during the 1996 Farm Act period (1996-2002). 
The impacts of greater planting flexibility and market orientation, brought 
about by the 2002 Farm Act, have contributed to increased yields. Previously, 39 
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Figure 10
Percent of peanut base acres* planted by county, 2005-07
* Percent of base acres indicates the ratio of average plantings during 2005-07 to base acres. Base acres, which generally reflect 
average plantings during 1998-2001, are the peanut acreage eligible to participate in government commodity programs.










the quota system may have hindered yield improvements by creating rigidities 
in planting decisions, such as preventing movement to more productive areas. 
Before 2002, for example, the cost of acquiring quota rights, and restrictions 
on the transfer of quota rights between counties and States, tended to concen-
trate production on land originally granted quota acreage “allotments.” Higher 
prices for quota peanuts encouraged less efficient quota holders to continue 
producing, and acquiring quota rights to expand production was costly or 
impossible for more efficient producers elsewhere. 
Many of those who ceased producing peanuts after 2002 were likely smaller 
scale, less competitive quota owners or operators who relied on the $610-per-
ton quota loan rate to cover production costs. Meanwhile, other more efficient 
producers—probably either those who had been growing nonquota peanuts 
for export or new producers attracted by the opportunity to sell peanuts 
domestically without renting quota rights—have expanded. Peanut farms are 
two-thirds larger than they were at the time of the buyout, and a greater share 
of farms fall into the largest sales class ($500,000 or more annually). Better 
growing conditions in the new areas, along with crop management practices 
employed by larger operations—such as longer crop rotation strategies and 
optimal use of inputs (e.g., fertilizers and chemicals)—have contributed to 
yield growth.40 
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40Acreage rather than quantity was 
used in this comparison because annual 
weather variations by State can skew 
the results, especially, when only 3 
years of post-buyout data is compared 
with pre-buyout data.
41NASS data show that flue-cured 
tobacco yields averaged over 2,150 
pounds per acre from 1980 to 2004, 
with standard deviations of less than 
180 pounds per acre, in eastern North 
Carolina. This compares with yields 
of less than 2,150 pounds per acre for 
most of the other flue-cured regions. 
The standard deviations for regions 
other than eastern North Carolina often 
exceeded 200 pounds per acre (standard 
deviations are a measure of the variance 
around the average). Lower figures 
indicate that yields are less volatile, 
implying less production risk.
Structural Adjustments to the Buyouts: 
Regional Shifts in Production
Tobacco Production Shifted Less After  
the Buyouts Than Peanut Production
Instead, tobacco farming became more concentrated in prime growing areas.
With tobacco production no longer constrained by geographic restrictions, 
tobacco area expanded in lower cost areas, such as the coastal plains of 
North and South Carolina, while higher cost tobacco farming areas, such 
as Tennessee, decreased in size. Tobacco production became more concen-
trated in the key tobacco production States: Kentucky for burley and North 
Carolina for flue-cured tobacco (fig. 11). Kentucky producers harvested 72 
percent of burley tobacco acreage in 2008 compared with 69 percent in the 
year before the buyout.40 Tennessee’s share of burley harvested acreage fell 
to 14 percent in 2008 from 16 percent in 2004 and 19 percent in the 1999-
2002 period. In 2008, North Carolina accounted for 76 percent of flue-cured 
harvested acreage, up from 66 percent in 2004, while all other flue-cured-
producing States showed declines. 
The growing concentration of burley and flue-cured tobacco production in 
specific areas of central Kentucky and eastern North Carolina indicate that 
these regions remain especially suited to tobacco production. These regions 
have exhibited consistently higher yields and lower production costs and 
have a well-established production and distribution infrastructure capable of 
handling large quantities of tobacco. While declining in every other signifi-
cant production region, flue-cured acreage in eastern (coastal) North Carolina 
has expanded—perhaps benefiting from comparatively low land values, 
the ability to reduce unit costs with expanded production, and availability 
of relatively flat, fertile land.41 Production in this region also benefits from 
proximity to port facilities, as exports continue to account for a growing 
share of flue-cured tobacco demand.
Burley tobacco production has declined predominantly in eastern portions of 
Kentucky and in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia, while remaining 
relatively stable in central and western regions of Kentucky (See burley 
map). Burley tobacco yields in Kentucky’s eastern region and in Tennessee 
tend to be lower, which boosts production costs per pound and lowers profit-
ability. According to NASS data, burley tobacco yields averaged less than 41 
The Post-Buyout Experience: Peanut and Tobacco Sectors Adapt to Policy Reform / EIB-60 
Economic Research Service / USDA
Burley tobacco
Note: The tobacco buyout was enacted in 2004, but took effect in 2005.
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2,000 pounds per acre from 1980-2004 in these regions compared with 
higher yields in the central and western portions of Kentucky. 
Producers are starting to grow some burley tobacco outside its traditional 
production regions. Flue-cured tobacco producers in the Piedmont regions of 
North Carolina and Virginia are experimenting with burley tobacco produc-
tion, and Amish tobacco farmers around Lancaster, Pennsylvania, have also 
started raising burley tobacco (Bickers, March 16, 2006). Pennsylvania had 
no reported burley acreage prior to 2005, but by 2008, it ranked third among 
the seven burley-producing States—behind Kentucky and Tennessee—
accounting for 4 percent of U.S. burley tobacco production. Burley tobacco 
yields of Pennsylvania farmers have been consistently higher than the 
national average, which helps them to compete with farmers in the traditional 
burley production regions. 42 
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42 If the farmland changes hands 
before the end of the 10-year period, 
a covenant must be added to the sales 
contract that prevents the new owner 
from raising tobacco on the land until 
the 10-year period has passed.
43Maryland tobacco producers produc-
ing type 32 could enroll in the program 
any time between 2000 and 2004.
44 “End of an Era For Maryland 
Tobacco,” Washington Post, Thursday, 
March 1, 2007.
Other Tobacco Buyout Experiences
Maryland’s Self-Funded Buyout
As foreign demand dropped for Maryland tobacco, the State launched a long-
term program to phase out production. Most Maryland tobacco producers 
enrolled in the program, and the U.S. supply of this type of tobacco was 
reduced. 
Three years before the Federal tobacco buyout, Maryland funded its own 
tobacco buyout program to reduce Maryland Tobacco type 32 production. 
The buyout was prompted by declining demand for Maryland tobacco, which 
was primarily exported to Europe, where older smokers preferred the heavier 
smoke produced by the fast-burning Maryland tobacco leaf used in blends 
(Yancy). However, younger European smokers preferred lighter cigarettes 
and alternative blends were developed, which reduced demand for Maryland 
leaf.
Maryland did not participate in the Federal tobacco program and was there-
fore ineligible for quota buyout payments. However, in 1999, Maryland 
allocated $78 million of the $4 billion received from tobacco settlement 
money to fund its tobacco buyout (Frisman). The Maryland tobacco buyout 
program pays tobacco producers $1 per pound each year for 10 years if they 
voluntarily agree to give up tobacco production permanently, as long as they 
continue operating the farm for at least 10 years for other purposes (Southern 
Maryland Agricultural Development Commission).42 Eligibility was based 
on the producer’s average tobacco sales from 1996-98, with payment 
contracts effective from 2001 to 2015, depending on when the farmer 
enrolled in the buyout.43 
By the time of the Federal buyout in 2004, about 85 percent of the 990 
eligible Maryland farmers were participating in the State program and had 
converted their land to other agricultural uses. Currently, the majority of 
the 100 farmers growing Maryland tobacco are Amish farmers who do not 
accept Government payments.44 Production of type 32 tobacco in Maryland 
fell from an average of 7,000 acres per year in the 3 years preceding the 
buyout to 1,133 acres in the last 3 years that the Maryland producers could 
enroll in the program (2001-2004).43 
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45The referenced source, Tobacco 
Farmers in Crisis, is an organization, 
established in 2005, representing Cana-
dian tobacco growers facing economic 
hardship.
46The funds were provided through 
the Tobacco Adjustment Assistance 
Program (TAAP).
47An additional $15 million was allo-
cated to fund community development 
initiatives. 
Other Tobacco Buyout Experiences
Canada’s Partial Tobacco Buyout
In 2005, Canada bought out some of its tobacco growers to reduce quota 
and to bring supply closer to reduced demand. However, demand continued 
to decline, and Canada implemented a transition program to further assist 
tobacco farmers who wanted to exit production. 
Canadian tobacco producers contended with issues similar to those of 
U.S. tobacco producers before the U.S. buyout. Canadian producers faced 
declining demand for their tobacco leaf due to falling domestic cigarette 
consumption related to higher taxes (Tobacco Farmers in Crisis),45 and 
higher taxes led to the development of a significant market in cheaper, 
contraband cigarettes. By 2007, over 40 percent of cigarettes sold in Canada 
were contraband. To remain competitive with the contraband cigarettes, 
legitimate manufacturers imported cheaper tobacco (Ontario Flue-Cured 
Tobacco Growers’ Marketing Board, 2008 Annual Report). 
Since Canadian tobacco producers have a quota system that limits their 
tobacco production, the reduction in tobacco demand led to quota reductions. 
In addition to facing declining quotas, Canadian tobacco producers had to 
invest in equipment in 2002 to reduce nitrosamines in tobacco. The quota 
reductions and rising investment costs put economic pressure on the tobacco 
producers. In 2005, the Federal and provincial governments provided funding 
for a partial buyout of tobacco quotas, with farmers competing to retire their 
quota through bidding.46 Thirty-six percent of bids by farmers in Ontario 
were accepted, vs. 53 of 57 bids from Quebec. 
The buyout was partially intended to help the farmers who were still 
producing tobacco remain viable. However, the partial buyout did not stem 
the falling demand for Canadian tobacco leaf, and tobacco quota levels 
continued to fall. In 2008, the Ontario tobacco quota level totaled 20 million 
pounds compared with an estimated 87.9 million pounds in 2005 (Ontario 
Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers’ Marketing Board Annual Reports). In addi-
tion to falling quota, the remaining Canadian tobacco farmers experienced 
rising tobacco production costs, while tobacco prices remained steady from 
2005 to 2007. Because most Canadian tobacco is sold at auction, Canadian 
producers were unsure of the price they would receive for their crop until 
harvest. The resulting financial stress caused the number of Ontario tobacco 
farmers to fall from 580 in 2005 to 444 in 2007 and prompted repeated calls 
for another tobacco buyout. 
In August 2008, the Canadian Government announced that it was providing 
$286 million to tobacco producers through the Tobacco Transition Program 
to assist remaining farmers in exiting the tobacco industry (Agriculture and 
Agri-Food Canada).47 The program provides $1.05 per pound for tobacco 
quota. Producers who accept the transition payments will not be able to 
return to tobacco production. 44 
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Conclusions
Market Forces Provide Signals in the  
New Policy Setting 
The buyouts fostered rapid adjustments among peanut and tobacco 
producers, with production now more responsive to demand developments 
and efficiency considerations.
The peanut and tobacco buyouts each arose from international pressures that 
created concerns about declining quota levels and the ability to sustain the 
programs at no net cost to the Government. The 2002 Farm Bill included a 
buyout of the peanut marketing quota, and made peanut producers eligible 
for a new marketing loan program as well as for direct and countercyclical 
payments. The 2004 tobacco buyout ended quotas and loan programs with 
no additional support beyond the buyout payments. The buyouts represented 
milestone policy changes that ushered in structural adjustments, such as 
farm consolidation and regional shifts in production. Once the buyouts were 
enacted, these adjustments occurred rapidly. Ensuing developments were 
guided by market forces, including changes in domestic and foreign demand, 
and a movement toward larger operations in regions best suited for produc-
tion. Average tobacco and peanut acreage and average total acres per farm 
grew after the buyouts as both sectors consolidated.
With the elimination of price supports and assurances of a buyer, growers 
adapted to increased market risk by engaging more in contracting. Without 
minimum price supports, farmers had less assurance of recovering invest-
ment costs from their sales. Marketing contracts provided a method for 
farmers to decrease price uncertainty and share output price risk with buyers, 
making contracts appealing to peanut and tobacco growers in the new post-
buyout environment. 
Following the buyouts, the location of tobacco and peanut farms was increas-
ingly determined by market forces and tied to costs, quality, and yields. With 
quota transfer restrictions no longer in place, interstate and intrastate move-
ments occurred where opportunities for efficiency gains existed. Increased 
efficiency and lower prices contributed to stability, and even to a resumption 
of demand growth, particularly in export markets. 45 
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Quota removals and reduced price supports for peanuts—or, in the case 
of tobacco, the complete elimination of price supports—have allowed the 
U.S. supply of peanuts and tobacco to more closely match the domestic 
and foreign demand for these commodities. Prices offered for peanuts and 
tobacco fell after the quota buyouts since producers no longer had to lease 
quota. Domestic demand for peanuts benefited from lower retail prices, and 
both peanut and tobacco exports improved due to lower prices and a weaker 
dollar. Although declining domestic cigarette consumption has reduced 
domestic demand for U.S.-grown burley and flue-cured tobacco, there is a 
growing niche market for dark tobacco, boosting its demand and acreage. 
After Canada’s and Maryland’s buyouts, the demand for their respective 
tobacco products continued to fall, resulting in sharply reduced production. 
These cases illustrate that changes in demand are a central determinant of 
how agricultural sectors evolve after a policy change. The experience of the 
peanut and tobacco sectors demonstrates that adaptation to policy changes 
can occur quickly and that a stronger market orientation supports more cost-
competitive production and greater responsiveness to changes in demand. 46 
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Appendix table 1 
Characteristics of peanut farms, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007
Item   2001 (A)  2002 (B)  2004 (C)  2006 (D)  2007 (E)
 Farm size (acres per farm):
  Operated  *860  907 E  *894 E  1,054  1,525 BC
  Owned  *356  398  a437  524  *726
 Peanut acreage and yield:
  Harvested (average peanut acres per farm)  *120 E  137 E  156 E  182 E  227 ABCD
  Yield (pounds per acre)  2,605  2,352 CDE  3,022 B  2,980 B  3,148 B
 Percent of peanut production value
   under marketing contracts  a24 CDE  38 CDE  81 ABDE  63 ABC  57 ABC
Other crop acreage (average per farm):
   Cotton  *161 DE  231  193 DE  308 AC  300 AC
   Corn for grain  *76  38 E  53 E  50 E  *158 BCD
   Soybeans  *26 DE  41 E  43 E  54 A  *94 ABC
   Wheat  *19 E  *48  *24  23  *86 A
   Tobacco  a2 BE  *6 A  a7  *4  *7 A
 Production specialty1 (percent of farms):
   Peanut  *53 E  41 DE  41 E  27 B  *18 ABC
   Cotton  a24  *12 D  *14 D  35 BCE  *19 D
   General crop  a9 CE  *25  26 A  18 E  32 AD
   Tobacco  a4  a9  a8  *2  *2
   Cattle  a1  a5  a4  *5  a6
 Sales class (percent of farms):
   $500,000 or more  *8  a14  15  22  33
   $250,000-$499,999  *12  *15  *27  26  26
   $100,000-$249,999  *38  *20  *20  20  16
   $40,000-$99,999  a22  *29  *24  14  *17
   $39,999 or less  a19  *21  *14  17  a8
 Regions2 (percent of farms):
   Mid-Atlantic  a24  19  10  10  13
   Southeast  *45  67  69  84  75
   Southwest  a30  *11  *20  a6  *12
1 The production specialty refers to the commodity that accounted for 50 percent or more of the farm’s value of production.  General crop farms did 
not have a single commodity that met this criterion. 
2 The Mid-Atlantic region consists of Virginia and northeastern counties in North Carolina.  The Southeast region includes the  southeastern coun-
ties in North Carolina and all of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.  The Southwest region includes Texas and Oklahoma.   
Coefficient of Variation = (Standard Error/Estimate) x 100.   
*Indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.  
a indicates that CV is above 50.
Letters A, B, C, D, and E indicate significant column difference tests based on t-statistics at a 90-percent confidence level or higher.
Rounded percents may not add precisely to 100. 
Source:  2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), National Agricultural Statistics Service, and 
ERS, USDA. 
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Appendix table 2 
Characteristics of peanut farms after the peanut buyout for selected years
Item   2002 (A)  2004 (B)  2006 (C)  2007 (D)
Number of peanut farms  8,086 D  8,608 D  6,386 D  5,134 ABC
   Percent with a peanut  
   marketing/production contract  40 BCD  79 AC  55 AB  65 A
Peanuts as percent of value of production  28  32  25  28
Peanut acres per farm  137 D  156 D  182 D  227 ABC
Operated acres per farm  907 D  *894 D  1,054  1,525 AB
   Owned and operated  *387  a423  497  *707
   Rented  520 D  427 D  556 D  816 ABC
   Cropland acres  676 D  606 D  798 D  1,050 ABC
Operator occupation (percent):
   Farming  85  79  82  87
   Nonfarm  a7  14 C  a2 BD  *13 C
   Retired  a8  *7 CD  0 B  0 B
Operator age (mean)  50  53  55 A  54
   Less than 50 years (percent)  52 CD  40  32 A  29 A
   65 or more (percent)  24  *20  19  *18
Operator education (percent):
   Completed high school  90  87 D  95  97 B
   Completed college  *19  *24  25  28
Farm organization (percent):
   Sole/family proprietor  80  86 A  82 A  84 A
   Partnership  *12  a8  9  12
   Family corporation  a5  5 C  *1 BD  *5 C
Number of commodities per farm
  3.7 D  3.5 D  3.4 D  4.9 ABC 
Percent of farms raising:
   Corn  38 D  41 D  32 D  59 ABC
   Hay  *32  27  25  33
   Cotton  57  55  61  62
   Soybeans  23  21 D  22  31 B
   Cattle  42  44  36  38
Household income/farm family (dollars)  76,643  *109,938  117,878  *110,912
   Farm income/farm family  a21,264 BC  *74,224 A  62,088 A  *65,427
   Off-farm income/farm family  55,380 B  35,714 A  *55,790  45,485
Average value in dollars per farm:
   Farm assets  *937,706 CD  *1,173,570  1,673,032 A  2,128,666 A
   Farm debt  *162,009  *140,065  133,057  184,620
   Farm business net worth  *775,697 CD  *1,033,505  1,539,976 A  1,944,046 A
Business debt/asset ratio  17 CD  *12  8 A  9 A
Coefficient of Variation = (Standard Error/Estimate) x 100.  
*Indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.    
a indicates that CV is above 50.
Letters A, B, C, and D indicate significant column differences based on t-statistics at a 90-percent confidence level or higher.
Source:  2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), National Agricultural Statistics Service, and 
ERS, USDA.48 
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Appendix table 3 
Comparison of burley tobacco farms before and after tobacco buyout1
Item  2004 (A)  2005 (B)  2006 (C)  2007(D) 
 Number of tobacco farms  39,215 BCD  19,233 A  13,443 A  *12,973 A
   Percent with a tobacco  
   marketing/production contract  31 BC  78 AD  71A  49 B
Tobacco as percent of value of production  43  a21  33  39
 Operated acres per farm  191 C  215  328 A  247
    Owned and operated  116 CD  138  169 A  190 A
    Rented  *70  *56 C  *136 BD  a44 C
Cropland acres operated  106 C  *133  215 A  124
Tobacco acres per farm  5.0 C  *6.3  10.1 A  *10.5
Percent of total labor expenses:
   Operator and unpaid labor2  84 BC  69 A  59 A   79
 Operator occupation (percent):
   Farming  41  *50  42 A  *34
   Retired  *18 CD  a16 CD  0 AB  0 AB
Operator age (mean)  57 CD  55  49 A  50 A
   Less than 50 years (percent)  37  46  *37  47
   65 or more (percent)  34 CD  *23  a8 A  a8 A
Operator education (percent):
   Completed high school  68 CD  84  97 A  88 
   Completed college  a9 B  0 AC  *6 B  a7
Farm organization (percent):
   Sole/family proprietor  92  97  95  86
   Partnership  a8  *3  a4  a14
Number of commodities per farm  2.8 D  2.3 D  2.8 D  4.1 ABC
   Percent of farms with one  *12 BD  *32 AD  a16  0 AB
   Percent of farms with two  27  33  a29  *19
   Percent of farms with three  42 B  *18 A  a38  *39
   Percent of farms with four or more  18  17  18  41
Percent of farms raising:
   Corn  *16  *18  *17  *26
   Hay  72  57  78  73
   Soybeans  *4 C  *9  *13 A  a8
   Cattle  59  *35  *52  *43
Household income/farm family (dollars)  53,597  54,495  80,436  60,175
   Farm income/farm family  *10,414 C  *20,022 C  47,414 ABD  a 8,741 C
   Off-farm income/farm family  43,183  34,474 D  33,022 D  51,434 BC
Average value in dollars per farm:
   Farm assets  465,056 C  557,464  802,981 A  651,486
   Farm debt  37,068  *19,488 C  *79,395 B  a43,254
   Farm business net worth  427,988 CD  537,976  723,586 A  608,233 
Business debt/asset ratio  8 B  *3 AC  *10 B  a7
1Tobacco quotas and price supports ended after 2004 when the tobacco buyout program began.  Table includes all farms raising tobacco in the 
traditional burley tobacco production region. Most of these farms grow only burley tobacco, but some may also grow dark or flue-cured tobacco.
2An imputed wage rate is used to value unpaid labor hours.  
Coefficient of Variation = (Standard Error/Estimate) x 100.   
*Indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.    
a indicates that CV is above 50.  
Letters A, B, C, and D indicate significant column differences based on t-statistics at a 90-percent confidence level or higher.   
Source:  2004–07 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), National Agricultural Statistics Service, and ERS, USDA. 49 
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Appendix table 4 
Comparison of flue-cured tobacco farms before and after tobacco buyout1
Item   2004 (A)  2005 (B)  2006 (C)  2007 (D)
Number of tobacco farms  11,062 BCD  3,766 A  3,469 A   *2,639 A
  Percent with tobacco  
  marketing/production contract  47 BCD  88 A  76 A   83 A 
Tobacco as percent of value of production  45  37  47  47
  Operated acres per farm  566 D  690  662  906 A
    Owned and operated  *275  222  218  272
    Rented  275 BD  456 A  428   615 A
  Cropland acres operated  355 BD  547 A  489   694 A
Flue-cured tobacco acres per farm  32.6 CD  46.9 D  59.7 AD  84.2 ABC
Percent of total labor expenses:
  Operator and unpaid labor2  50 CD  43 D  35 AD  28 ABC
Operator occupation (percent):
   Farming  81 C  92  97 A  94
   Nonfarm  *11 BC  a2 A  a1 A  a6
   Retired  a8 CD  a6  0 A  0 A
Operator age (mean)  54  53  53  52
   Less than 50 years (percent)  *33  34  *25  38
   65 or more (percent)  *14  *17  *9  a16
Operator education (percent):
   Completed high school  83 D  86 D  93  95 AB
   Completed college  *11 B  0 ACD  *21 B  *16 B
Farm organization (percent):
   Sole/family proprietor  89   81   85   82C
   Partnership  *7   *15   *5   a9
   Family corporation  *4 BC  a1 AD  a1 AD   *8 BC
Number of commodities per farm  3.3 D  3.7 D  3.4 D  4.6 ABC 
Percent of farms raising:
   Corn  32  38  39  *48
   Hay  *32  35  *29  *24
   Cotton  *28  14  22  *22
   Soybeans  44 B  65 A  60  62
   Peanuts  *13  9  10  *11
   Cattle  *34  26  *24  *21
 Household income/farm family (dollars)  103,024  133,002  *111,662  139,934
   Farm income/farm family  64,243 B  104,272 A  *78,265  109,740
   Off-farm income/farm family  38,781 B  28,720 A  *32,397  30,193
 Average value in dollars per farm:
   Farm assets  927,587  1,208,370  1,201,051  1,574,797
   Farm debt  *88,030  77,606 D  91,900  138,104 B
   Farm business net worth  839,556  1,130,764  1,109,151  1,436,693
Business debt/asset ratio  *9  6  8  9
1Tobacco quotas and price supports ended after 2004 when the tobacco buyout program began.  Table includes all farms raising tobacco in 
the traditional flue-cured tobacco production region. Most of these farms grow only flue-cured tobacco, but some may also grow dark or burley 
tobacco.
2An imputed wage rate is used to value unpaid labor hours.
Coefficient of Variation = (Standard Error/Estimate) x 100.   
*Indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.    
a indicates that CV is above 50.  
Letters A, B, C, and D indicate significant column differences based on t-statistics at a 90-percent confidence level or higher.   
Source:  2004–07 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), National Agricultural Statistics Service, and ERS, USDA.  50 
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Data Resources
Agricultural Resource Management Survey Dataase  
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ARMS/).  Annual survey of farm and 
ranch operators administered by USDA’s NASS.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.
jsp?survey=ap.). Provides average price data for selected areas and food 
products. The retail price for peanut butter is provided on a monthly basis 
back to 1984.
Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (FATUS)  
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/FATUS/). Provides U.S. agricultural exports 
and imports, volume and value, by country, by commodity, and by calendar 
year, fiscal year, and month, for varying periods, such as 1935 to the present 
or 1989 to the present. Updated by month and by year.
Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD) (http://www.fas.usda.gov/
psdonline/psdHome.aspx/). Contains official USDA data on production, 
supply, and distribution of agricultural commodities for the United States 
and major importing and exporting countries. The database provides projec-
tions for the coming year and historical data for more than 200 countries and 
major crop, livestock, fishery, and forest products.
WTO Agricultural Trade Policy Commitments Data Base  
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/db/wto/). Contains data on implementation of 
trade policy commitments by World Trade Organization member countries. 
Data on domestic support, export subsidies, and tariffs are organized for 
comparison across countries. This queriable database offers various options 
for viewing and downloading data.
Quick Stats: Agricultural Statistics Data Base  
(http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/). Offers U.S., State, and county-
level agricultural statistics (including price, production, and yield) for many 
commodities and data series. Quick Stats offers the ability to query by 
commodity, State, and year. The dataset can be downloaded for easy use in a 
database or spreadsheet.
Farm Program Acres (http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/baseacres/). Allows 
downloading and mapping of county-level farm program and planted acreage 
data for nine major program crops (corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats, wheat, 
rice, cotton, peanuts, and oilseeds).
Farm Programs, Price Supports, Participation, and Payment Rates 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/aotables/jul2003/aotab19.
xls). Contains program parameters for individual commodities.
CCC Net Outlays by Commodity and Function  
(http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dam/bud/CCC%20Estimates%20Book/ 
2006PresBud/ Pres%20Bud%20Table%2035.pdf). Provides total 
Commodity Credit Corporation expenditures by commodity.54 
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U.S. and State Farm Income Data. Includes calendar year data on direct 
Government payments:




U.S. Trade Reports. FASonline U.S. Trade Internet System  
(http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrade/). A searchable database with U.S. bilateral 
import and export data (quantity and value) by commodity. Monthly and 
annual data are available dating back to 1989.
Price Support Loan and LDP Activity Report (http://www.fsa.usda.gov/
dafp/psd/Reports.htm). Includes data on year-to-date and the previous 4 years 
of marketing loan and loan deficiency payment expenditures.
National and County Commodity Loan Rates (http://www.fsa.usda.gov/
dafp/psd/LoanRate.htm). Provides county and national marketing loan rates.
U.S. WTO Domestic Support and Support Reduction Commitments 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/FarmPolicy/data/totalusa.xls). Summarizes 
the U.S. domestic support notifications to the World Trade Organization.
Costs of Production, ERS, USDA. (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/
CostsAndReturns/). USDA estimates of the annual production costs and 
returns for the major field crop and livestock enterprises for the United States 
and major production regions. 
Additional Tobacco Sources
Economic Research Service, Data and Reports. Tobacco is included in 
ongoing ERS research on farm structure, trade, and other key issues. http://
www.ers.usda.gov/Browse/Crops/Tobacco.htm
U.S. Department of Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB). 
Tobacco Statistics. TTB, (http://www.treas.gov/index.html), collects infor-
mation on tobacco production and excise taxes and conducts product anal-
ysis in order to ensure tax and trade compliance with the Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act and the Internal Revenue Code: http://www.ttb.gov/
tobacco/tobacco_stats.shtml
Agricultural Marketing Service, Tobacco Stocks. AMS reports stocks of 
tobacco leaf by type, as well as production, stocks, supply, and disappear-





Foreign Agricultural Service, Tobacco Statistics and Reports. FAS provides 
historical World Market and Trade Reports, as well as links to other histor-
ical USDA tobacco data sources such as Tobacco Outlook and Tobacco 
Auction Reports. http://www.fas.usda.gov/cots/tobstats.html